A MOVE IN THE BRIGHT DIRECTION: WHY CONGRESS
HAS THE POWER TO BRING THE DOCKET OUT OF THE
SHADOWS
Kevin C. Amici*
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE SHADOW DOCKET
Abortion, vaccine mandates in schools, and immigration all have
two things in common: they are controversial topics in American
discourse, and they have all been the subject of important rulings on
the “shadow docket” of the Supreme Court.1 “Shadow docket”2 is a
popular term used to describe all cases that the Supreme Court
handles outside of its traditional merits docket.3 The merits docket
typically consists of sixty to seventy cases that undergo multiple rounds
of briefing and oral argument, culminating in written opinions that
specify both the Court’s reasoning in its decision and identify which
Justices voted for and against the resolution.4 The shadow docket, on
the other hand, consists of “thousands of other decisions” that typically
undergo only one round of briefing, rarely identify the Justices’ votes,

* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude,
2020, New Jersey Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Professor Thomas
Healy for his thoughtful guidance and advisement. I would also like to thank my
colleagues on the Law Review for their constructive and insightful feedback.
1
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 529–30 (2021) (recent
case concerning challenges to Texas abortion law); Klassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No.
21A15, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3677 (2021) (recent case concerning vaccine mandates for
Indiana University students); Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2534–35 (2022) (recent
order concerning the “remain in Mexico” policy for asylum seekers).
2
See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 3–5 (2015). University of Chicago professor William Baude first coined the
term “shadow docket” in this essay when referring to “a range of orders and summary
decisions that defy [the Supreme Court’s] normal procedural regularity.” Id. at 1.
3
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW
AT THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2021) [hereinafter CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW AT THE
SUPREME COURT ] (testimony of Steven I. Vladeck, Charles Alan Wright Chair in
Federal Courts, University of Texas), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content
/uploads/2021/06/Vladeck-SCOTUS-Commission-Testimony-06-30-2021.pdf.
4
Id.
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and offer little to no insight into the Justices’ reasoning.5 The most
common examples of orders from the shadow docket include staying
lower court decisions, vacating a stay (often in the case of executions),
granting emergency injunctions, and vacating lower courts’ grants of
emergency injunction.6
Recent developments in the political landscape, including
changes in the Court’s composition, have increased national discourse
about Supreme Court reform. The swift replacement of the late Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg with the ideologically juxtaposed Justice Amy
Coney-Barrett led many to call upon President Biden to reform the
Court.7 In response, President Biden established the Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
(“Commission”) to brainstorm ideas for reform and assess their
practicality.8 The Commission’s objective was to provide an “analysis
of the principal arguments in the contemporary public debate for and
against Supreme Court reform . . . .”9 Through the testimony of
experts, the Commission considered all avenues of reform, from
adding Justices to the Court to implementing term limits.10 It also
investigated the Court’s increasingly controversial shadow docket,
which is the subject of this Comment.11 The Commission reached its
final conclusions on docket reform in December 2021, and the
resulting recommendations drive much of this discussion.12
In addition to the President’s Commission, Congress has taken
steps to investigate the shadow docket in both of its chambers.13 In

5

Id.
Id. at 4.
7
Jonathan Lemire & Jessica Gresko, Group to Study More Justices, Term Limits for
Supreme Court, AP NEWS (Apr. 9, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donaldtrump-ruth-bader-ginsburg-amy-coney-barrett-judiciary8734750b75318ed429bf206e2a8af6d1.
8
Id.
9
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., FINAL REPORT i (2021)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021
/12/SCOTUS-Report-Final-12.8.21-1.pdf.
10
See generally id.
11
See generally CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW AT THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3.
12
See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 9.
13
See generally The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts.,
Intell. Prop. & the Int. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter
House Committee]; Texas’s Unconstitutional Abortion Ban and the Role of the Shadow Docket:
Hearing before Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter Senate
Committee].
6
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August 2021, numerous orders stoked political polarization
concerning the shadow docket, including the overturning of President
Biden’s COVID-19 eviction moratorium, to the Court’s refusal to block
the Texas law restricting abortion access.14 On September 3, 2021,
Senator Dick Durbin criticized both the process and the holding of the
Texas case and announced that the Senate Judiciary Committee would
respond by “hold[ing] a hearing examining the Supreme Court’s
abuse of its ‘shadow-docket . . . .’”15 Neither the House nor the Senate
hearings led Congress to take any concrete actions, but cries for reform
get louder with every controversial decision.
These cries for reform underscore the Court’s lack of
transparency.16 Many decisions from the shadow docket are not
accompanied by reasoned opinions and often do not disclose which
Justices voted for the resolution and which ones dissented.17 Experts
have proposed that Congress should compel the Court to issue written
opinions when altering the status quo18 and likewise compel the
Justices to disclose their votes in all instances when cases are referred
to the full Court.19 It is uncertain whether Congress has the authority
to compel the Court in either manner without overstepping its
constitutional bounds and violating separation of powers principles.

14

See Press Release, Comm. on the Judiciary, Senate Judiciary Committee to
Examine the Texas Abortion Ban and the Supreme Court’s Abuse of its “Shadow
Docket” (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases
/senate-judiciary-committee-to-examine-the-texas-abortion-ban-and-the-supremecourts-abuse-of-its-shadow-docket.
15
Id. Senator Durbin stated that the Senate Judiciary Committee “must examine
not just the constitutional impact of allowing the Texas law to take effect, but also the
conservative Court’s abuse of the shadow docket.” Id. Note Senator Durbin’s
reference to the Court as “conservative,” highlighting how increasingly partisan this
issue has become. This Comment will not take a partisan stance on whether reforms
to the docket should or should not be implemented, but merely assess whether
reforms can be implemented. Id.
16
See CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW AT THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19–20.
17
Id. at 2–3.
18
See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
TRANSPARENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2021) (statement of
Deepak Gupta, Founding Principal, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, DC)
[hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GuptaSCOTUS-Commission-Testimony-Final.pdf; Jeffrey L. Fisher, Opinion, The Supreme
Court’s Secret Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09
/25/opinion/the-supreme-courts-secret-power.html?partner=slack&smid=sl-share.
19
Fisher, supra note 1818.
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This Comment will address these separation of powers concerns
and argue that Congress has the power to (1) compel the Court to
issue written opinions when it alters the status quo by reversing a lower
court and (2) compel the Court to disclose all the Justices’ votes. Part
II of this Comment will discuss the congressional hearings addressing
the shadow docket in detail by first highlighting common concerns
about the shadow docket, and then explaining the resolutions experts
believe would remedy these concerns. Part III will analyze the
separation of powers between Congress and the Court. Part IV will
then take the separation of powers principles from Part III and apply
them to the remedies from Part II. Part IV ultimately concludes that
Congress has the power to compel the Court to implement these
changes through its Necessary and Proper powers.
II. PROPOSALS: HOW CONGRESS CAN REDRESS THE SHADOW DOCKET
Experts have proposed numerous solutions to remedy the pitfalls
of the shadow docket. This Part will begin by discussing why a lack of
transparency is the docket’s greatest weakness and highlight what
experts propose Congress can do to fix it.
A. Motivations: Explaining the Lack of Transparency in Reasoning
Many critics of the shadow docket argue that the Court’s lack of
transparency in its reasoning is a serious concern.20 Specifically,
commentators are concerned about the implications of shadow docket
orders that reverse a lower court’s directive yet do not include a written
opinion.21 This lack of reasoning contrasts entirely with the Court’s
merits cases, which always include detailed opinions explaining the
majority’s logic and provide guidance for lower courts.22
Detailed reasoning is important because it provides lower courts
with guidance—the Supreme Court offers the final word on issues that
it sees.23 The Constitution vests the judicial power in “one supreme
Court,” and lower courts must follow the directives of that Court.24
Lower courts must follow the precedent that this Court establishes
“unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system.”25
20

See CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW AT THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19–20.
Id.
22
Id.
23
See Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor, The Precedential Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Emergency Stays, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 844 (2021).
24
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
25
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
21
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The Court’s current absence of reasoning in many of its shadow docket
orders, however, makes it incredibly difficult for lower courts to apply
the law when parallel circumstances arise.26 Scholars, judges, and
litigants alike often debate the extent to which these decisions are
controlling. It is long established that all Supreme Court cases are
completely controlling over lower courts, 27 but shadow docket orders
without a reasoned opinion complicate that relationship. If these
orders are not completely controlling, then the commonly accepted
custom that lower courts must follow the directives of the Supreme
Court “no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think
it to be” is erroneous.28
Many of the Court’s COVID-19 emergency orders exposed the
lack of transparency and the weaknesses associated with it. In South
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, for example, the Court granted
injunctive relief that effectively halted California restrictions on places
of worship during the COVID-19 pandemic.29 The Court did not issue
a majority opinion explaining the scope of the decision or its
reasoning.30 When a similar case came before the Court again, it was
swiftly dismissed with the (unknown) Justice abrasively stating that
“[t]his outcome is clearly dictated by this Court’s decision in [South
Bay].”31 It is easy to see how lower courts can become frustrated and
confused when trying to interpret a Supreme Court decision that
explains neither how the case was decided nor how its legal reasoning
should be applied in the future.
Scholars have also questioned the Court’s lack of reasoned
opinion writing in the context of executions, which are some of the
most frequent cases the Court handles on its shadow docket.32 Prior
to an execution, trial courts may consider whether more time is
required to contemplate its legality and may issue a stay of the

26

See McFadden & Kapoor, supra note 23, at 883–84 (suggesting this lack of
transparency by the Court may “erode the public’s faith in the constitutional power
structure as a whole” and “create confusion for litigants.”).
27
See Davis, 454 U.S. at 375.
28
Id.
29
141 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2021).
30
Id.
31
Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460, 1460 (2021) (emphasis added).
32
See, e.g., House Committee, supra note 13 (statement of Amir H. Ali, Director,
Washington, D.C. Office, Deputy Director of Supreme Court & Appellate Practice,
Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU
/JU03/20210218/111204/HHRG-117-JU03-Wstate-AliA-20210218-U2.pdf.
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execution to grant more time.33 The decision whether to stay an
execution may be appealed to the Supreme Court, and Justices are
often left with only a few hours to deliberate on whether to issue the
stay or authorize the execution.34 Like South Bay, orders concerning
execution are often resolved without a reasoned opinion explaining
the Court’s logic.35 Critics of the shadow docket posit that this absence
of reasoning leaves the public and the historical record with “little or
no indication of what made it lawful for this person to be executed.”36
Additionally, critics fear that the lack of published reasoning may cause
the Court to issue arbitrary orders, since it need not explain itself to
justify its decision.37
Three recent orders exemplify what scholars argue could be the
result of arbitrary decision-making.38 Each of these orders feature
virtually the same fact pattern: the defendant challenges a statute
allowing only a Christian spiritual advisor to be present at execution.39
In each of these cases, the petitioners challenged their executions,
arguing that each was entitled to a spiritual advisor of his choosing: a
Muslim prisoner requesting an iman, a Buddhist prisoner requesting
a Buddhist priest, and a Christian prisoner requesting a pastor.40
Without providing detailed reasoning or addressing the lower court’s
arguments, the Court ruled against the Muslim prisoner’s stay, and he
was executed without a spiritual advisor.41 The Buddhist prisoner had
his stay granted in a two-sentence order that said he could be executed
either if he was permitted to have a Buddhist priest or if the state
decided to deny spiritual advisors to all prisoners.42 The state chose
the latter option.43 Finally, under a new statute barring any spiritual
advisors, the Christian prisoner had his execution stayed in an order

33

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
35
Id. at 1.
36
Id. at 3.
37
Id. at 4.
38
Ali, supra note 32, at 4.
39
Id.; see generally Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019); Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct.
1475 (2019); Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725 (2021).
40
Ali, supra note 32, at 4–5; Ray, 139 S. Ct. at 661; Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1475; Smith,
141 S. Ct. at 725.
41
Ali, supra note 32, at 4; Ray, 139 S. Ct. at 661.
42
Ali, supra note 32, at 4–5; Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1475.
43
Ali, supra note 32, at 5.
34
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that provided no legal analysis.44 Scholars suggest that the Justices’
failure to explain the logic behind their decisions may have led to
arbitrary rulings.45
Justices have also expressed concern about the shadow docket’s
lack of transparency and reasoning.46 In a COVID-19 order lifting
some of California’s capacity restrictions on places of worship, Justice
Kagan, in dissent, argued that the majority’s complicated and
fractured reasoning was insufficient to guide lower courts and other
state governments.47 The case concerned complicated quarantine
restrictions, but as Justice Kagan pointed out, the order “[left] state
policymakers adrift, in California and elsewhere” because of its unclear
and limited reasoning.48 In another dissent, this time concerning a
high-profile abortion case, Justice Kagan argued that “the majority’s
decision is emblematic of too much of this Court’s shadow-docket
decisionmaking—which every day becomes more unreasoned,
inconsistent, and impossible to defend.”49 She alleged that the
majority “barely bother[ed] to explain its conclusion” and reviewed
the parties’ documents “only hastily.”50 Her criticisms highlight that
even when the Court does draft opinions, they are often limited in
their reasoning, with the dissents doing much of the heavy lifting.51
Not all of the Justices have concerns about the shadow docket,
however, as Justice Alito called criticisms of the docket “silly” and
“misleading.”52 In response to Justice Kagan’s dissent in Whole Woman’s
Health, Justice Alito argued that “[t]he truth of the matter . . . is that
there is nothing shadowy” about the docket.53 In another shadow
docket order featuring only a one-paragraph majority opinion, but
44

Ali, supra note 32, at 5; Smith, 141 S. Ct. at 725.
See, e.g., Ali, supra note 32, at 5.
46
See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2021)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
47
See id. at 723.
48
Id.
49
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142 S. Ct. 1347 (2022) (referring to the fact that
the majority opinion here is one paragraph, while the dissenting opinions is over two
pages).
52
Nina Totenberg, Justice Alito Calls Criticisms of the Shadow Docket ‘Silly’ and
‘Misleading’, NPR (Sept. 30, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/30
/1042051134/justice-alito-calls-criticism-of-the-shadow-docket-silly-and-misleading.
53
Id.
45

650

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:643

twenty-one pages of concurrences and dissents, Justices Kavanaugh
and Kagan engaged in a back-and-forth argument concerning the
Court’s usage of the shadow docket.54 Justice Kagan argued that the
opinion was “one more in a disconcertingly long line of cases in which
this Court uses its shadow docket to signal or make changes in the law,
without anything approaching full briefing and argument.”55 Justice
Kavanaugh responded to Justice Kagan by countering that her “catchy
but worn-out rhetoric” of the shadow docket was “off target,” and that
reasoning was not necessary because the majority’s opinion was not on
the merits.56
Despite Justice Kavanaugh’s dismissal, however, the majority in
Merrill managed to reverse a lower court without authoring a majority
opinion. Amir H. Ali, a witness at the Commission’s hearings, argued
that Justice Kavanaugh’s response was insufficient to explain the
Court’s “drastic departures from the ordinary functioning of the
judicial system, all of which seem to flow in one political direction.”57
He argued, contrary to Justice Kavanaugh’s assertion that the shadow
docket rhetoric is worn-out, that the dialogue is in fact “urgent and it
is precisely why public confidence in the Supreme Court is eroding.”58
Statistically, shadow docket orders rarely feature Justices crossing
ideological lines, raising even more concerns in the political
community about docket reform. In fact, Professor Steve Vladeck
noted that during the 2020–2021 term, sixty-eight shadow docket
orders contained a public dissent, and none of those dissents were
authored by “a Justice to the right of the Chief Justice join[ing] a
Justice to his left.”59 Likewise, criticism of the docket tends to track
ideological lines, with the more progressive-leaning Justices and
commentators seeking reform, and those leaning opposite finding no
grievances with the system.

54

See generally Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 889 (2022).
Id. at 889 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 879 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
57
Jordan S. Rubin, Kavanaugh Comment Ups Supreme Court Tension Over ‘Shadow
Docket’, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 8, 2022, 6:06 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/kavanaugh-comment-ups-supreme-court-tension-over-shadow-docket.
58
Id.
59
Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Sep. 3, 2021, 11:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/14 34002701881380864.
55
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B. Proposal 1: Requiring Opinion Writing
Scholars and experts suggest that Congress should mandate that
the Court author opinions that explain the reasoning for their orders.
Deepak Gupta argues that Justices should be required to give
explanations in the form of written opinions whenever the Court
changes the status quo and reverses a lower court’s decision.60 She
emphasized that “[r]eason-giving is a core feature of the American
legal system, and it is essential for public trust in the Court’s fair and
considered approach to judicial reasoning and decisionmaking.”61
Amir H. Ali makes a similar proposal for decisions regarding
executions.62 Under his proposal, Congress would compel the Court
to “state its reasons for concluding that the lower court’s decision [was
improper].”63 Steve Vladeck, the seminal proponent for shadow
docket reform, also proposes that the Court should be encouraged to
provide “at least a brief explanation” for any orders that “alter[] the
status quo vis-à-vis the lower courts.”64 Though Vladeck argues that the
Court should encourage opinion authorship, he believes in the
broader principle that it may be “time for Congress to re-assert some
modicum of control over the entire docket of the highest court in the
land, both procedurally and substantively.”65
Authoring written opinions in each instance the Court shifts the
status quo would enhance transparency, but it would also raise some
concerns. For example, what qualifies as an opinion? Need it meet a
certain word count? Does the Court need to satisfy a specific standard
and articulate each aspect of that standard? The Commission
described what reform might look like, explaining that mandatory
explanations “need not be lengthy, nor does anyone suggest that
opinions need to be written in every case. Instead, the goal is to enable
observers to understand the bases for the Court’s most significant
rulings—to follow the legal trail through each decision and from one
decision to the next.”66 Most importantly, would a congressional

60

See Gupta, supra note 18, at 22.
Id.
62
Ali, supra note 32, at 6.
63
Id.
64
CASE SELECTION AND REVIEW AT THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 25. Note
that Steve Vladeck argues that Congress merely “encourages” and does not compel the
Court in these instances. Id.
65
Id. at 26.
66
FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 209.
61
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mandate be constitutional, or would it violate separation of powers as
an unconstitutional encroachment into the judiciary?
C. Proposal 2: Requiring Vote Disclosure
Further adding to transparency issues, Justices do not need to,
and often fail to, publicly disclose their votes in shadow docket
orders.67 In a 2021 order halting the execution of Willie Smith, four
Justices publicly cast their vote to stay the execution, and three Justices
publicly voted against the stay.68 It is still a mystery which Justice or
Justices cast the swing vote, for Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch did
not disclose their vote to the public.69
Scholars suggest this ambiguity is “particularly troubling” and
raises significant questions about the Court’s transparency and
accountability.70 Simply because Justices serve life tenures does not
mean they do not have to “worry about losing their judicial position[]
over a controversial decision.”71 Justices are still accountable and are
subject to both impeachment72 and public opinion.73 Further, failing
to disclose votes leaves the public guessing and damages trust in the
institution.
Justices themselves have also seen the value of accountability
throughout the history of the Court.74 Before joining the Supreme
Court, then-Judge Ginsburg posited that “[d]isclosure of votes and
opinion writers . . . serves to hold the individual judge accountable”

67

See ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 18, at 13.
68
Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2021).
69
See id.
70
See, e.g., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 18, at 12.
71
Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per
Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (2012).
72
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (stating that federal judges shall hold their offices during
good behavior).
73
See, e.g., Candy Woodall et al., Abortion Rights Protests that Started at Supreme Court
Steps Move to Justices’ Front Doorsteps, USA TODAY (May 10, 2022, 4:34 PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/05/09/abortion-protestssupreme-court-justices/9710395002/?gnt-cfr=1 (explaining how members of the
public sought to hold Justices accountable by bringing protests to the Justices’ homes);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139–40
(1990) (explaining how Justice Blackmun continued to be “targeted for attack”
because of his decision in Roe v. Wade over sixteen years earlier).
74
See Robbins, supra note 71, at 1210.
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and “puts the judge’s conscience and reputation on the line.”75 Justices
are not only accountable to the people, but also to the consistency of
Justice Scalia famously
their own interpretive methodology.76
commented that placing one’s name on a viewpoint forces consistency
in decision-making and forbids a Justice from “today providing the
fifth vote for a disposition that rests upon one theory of law, and
tomorrow providing the fifth vote for a disposition that presumes the
opposite.”77
Scholars argue that the Court should consider publishing vote
tallies.78 Likewise, the Commission on the Supreme Court, in its final
report, endorsed a proposal that would “urge the Justices to disclose
their votes in emergency orders” in order to improve transparency.79
The Court has yet to implement this strategy on its own, and the words
of the Commission and experts are not enough.80 As a result, this
imperative may fall upon Congress to pass legislation mandating that
the Court tally and publish how the Justices voted for all orders which
are referred to the full Court. Would imposing a mandatory vote
disclosure by Congress violate separation of powers as an
unconstitutional encroachment into the judiciary? Part IV seeks to
answer that question using the principles of separation of powers
outlined below in Part III.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS: CONGRESS AND THE COURT’S
RELATIONSHIP
What powers does Congress have over the judiciary? The
founders established a careful system of checks and balances to
manage the relationships between each of the three branches of
government.81 This separation of powers serves as a safeguard against
the “encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense
of the other.”82 This Part discusses the powers possessed by both the

75

Id. at 1210 n.87 (quoting Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 139).
See id. at 1211.
77
See id. at n.90 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 SUP. CT. HIST.
33, 42 (1994)).
78
E.g., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 18, at 21.
79
FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 209.
80
See, e.g., Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2021).
81
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 264 (James Madison) (P.F. Collier 1901).
82
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
76
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judicial and legislative branches and identifies what power the latter
has over the former.
A. The Court’s Powers
Article III of the Constitution vests “[t]he judicial Power of the
United States . . . in one supreme Court.”83 Hamilton argued in
Federalist No. 78 that the Court is the least dangerous branch because
it has “no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no
active resolution whatever.”84 The judiciary’s lack of financial and
military power suggests that the Court is the weakest branch and is
therefore particularly vulnerable to encroachment from other
branches.85
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously asserted
that it is the Court’s job to “say what the law is.”86 This responsibility
rests primarily in the judiciary through its power of judicial review, and
Congress intrudes on this power when it attempts to “say what the law
is.” Article III further “gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them conclusively, subject to
review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”87 Thus,
attempts by Congress to pass legislation saying “what the law is” in a
manner that affects the decision of a case is an encroachment on the
judiciary’s duty to decide its cases. Put simply, Congress cannot
explicitly overrule a specific Supreme Court case by passing legislation.
The Court has the power to “say what the law is,” but the
Constitution is largely silent about the day-to-day procedures it uses to
conduct this business.88 Congress, on the other hand, has many of its
operations outlined explicitly in the Constitution’s text.89 Section B,

83

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (P.F. Collier 1901).
85
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Atticus DeProspo, Against Congressional Case
Snatching, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 791, 817 (2021).
86
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
87
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 212 (1995).
88
See Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 443, 457 (2013) (referencing the Constitution’s instructions for
Congress’s procedures in Article I, section 5).
89
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 5 (specifying that a journal of proceedings must be
kept, a two-thirds majority may expel a member, and neither chamber can adjourn for
more than three days without consent of the other chamber).
84
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below, examines how Congress uses its powers vested through the
Necessary and Proper clause to affect how the Court operates.
B. Congress’s Powers: Necessary and Proper
The responsibilities of Congress are outlined in Article I of the
Constitution, which vests “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a Congress of
the United States.”90 Anti-federalists feared that Congress would take
its powers too far by attempting to “draw[] all power into its impetuous
vortex.”91 Responding to this fear, the framers vested in Congress
enumerated powers. The legislature must not encroach beyond “the
legislative sphere” and it may not “invest itself or its members with
either executive power or judicial power.”92 Justice Marshall, again in
Marbury v. Madison, highlighted that “[t]he powers of the legislature
are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written.”93
The Constitution, however, provides little guidance for the Court
on how to conduct its day-to-day business, such as what cases it must
take, how long it must hold oral argument, or when to write an
opinion.94 Congress has used its powers under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to fill some of these gaps.95 Congress may use its powers
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to draft statutes “that will
enable the other two branches to do their jobs more effectively.”96
Some scholars even argue that the judiciary itself is “not selfexecuting,” and that “[u]ntil an Act of Congress spelled out such
specifics, there would be no Supreme Court . . . .”97 It is well accepted
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U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 272 (James Madison) (P.F. Collier 1901).
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Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (quoting J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 406 (1928)).
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
94
See Frost, supra note 88, at 457.
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See id.; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (stating that “Congress shall have Power . . . To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
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Frost, supra note 88, at 458 n.75 (quoting John Harrison, The Power of Congress
Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 532 (2000)).
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Id. at 458 n.74 (first quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 20 (6th ed. 2009); then quoting Edward
A. Hartnett, Not the King’s Bench, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 284 (2003)).
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and established that Congress has a critical role in shaping procedures
that the Court uses to conduct its business.
Congress has used its power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause throughout the nation’s history to impose rules on the Court.
For example, Congress enacted the first Judiciary Act of 1789 that,
among many rules, established the number of justices that would sit on
the Court, granted the Court authority to hire court clerks, and
mandated that Justices serve as circuit-court judges.98 Congress passed
the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, which permitted the Court to create
“general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence” on the
condition that those rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”99 In affirming the constitutionality of the Act, the
Court made clear that Congress has “undoubted power to regulate the
practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power
by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules
not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United
States.”100
Congress has also intervened in the field of judicial ethics, which
uniquely impacts Justices beyond the bench and into their private lives.
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989, for instance, prohibits Justices “from
most outside employment with the exception of teaching, for which
any compensation must be pre-approved by the Judicial Conference”
and bars Justices from receiving certain gifts that could cause a conflict
of interest.101
Finally, numerous other statutes passed by Congress govern the
Court’s current composition and procedure.102 28 U.S.C. § 1 defines
the Court as consisting of one Chief Justice and eight associate
Justices.103 Section 2 of that statute specifies that the Court’s term shall
begin on the “first Monday in October of each year and may hold such
adjourned or special terms as may be necessary.”104 28 U.S.C. § 453 sets
forth a specific oath of office that each Justice must take before
98
See id. at 458; An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
§1, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), invalidated by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
99
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).
100
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1940).
101
See Frost, supra note 88, at 451–52 n.38 (referencing Ethics in Government Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 7 §
502(a)(5))).
102
See id. at 459.
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28 U.S.C. § 1; see Frost, supra note 88, at 459.
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28 U.S.C. § 2.
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beginning his or her term.105 These are just several of many widely
accepted congressional controls over the Court.106 Section C will
outline when it is not so clear whether Congress is acting within its
powers.
C. When Congress Oversteps Its Bounds: Affecting Judicial DecisionMaking.
Section A of this Part defined that it is the Court’s duty to “say
what the law is,” while Section B explained that Congress can control
the Court through its powers vested in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. This Section will outline when Congress has overstepped its
bounds and when it is likely to overstep again by influencing the
decision-making process.
First, Congress cannot assume judicial responsibilities by
compelling the Court to “reach a specific substantive result.”107 The
Court asserted in United States v. Klein that Congress may issue
substantive law, but it cannot direct the Court to reach a particular
conclusion in a case.108 When Congress directs the Court to reach a
specific outcome, it performs a “purely judicial function” and
“seriously interfere[s] with the judiciary’s performance of its proper
function.”109 The Court affirmed this separation of legislative and
judicial powers in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit when it
held that “[t]here can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to
the imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges in
deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.”110
Second, Congress cannot dictate the judicial decision-making
process. Specifically, Congress violates separation of powers when it
“chooses the approach to judicial decisionmaking” because Congress
“can have no more than an advisory role in selecting the interpretive
process.”111 Congress crosses the line beyond a mere advisory role
when it enacts statutes that “decrease the impartiality of judicial
105

Id. § 453.
See Frost, supra note 88, at 459.
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William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on
Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 793 (1997).
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United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871).
109
Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 720 (1995).
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398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970).
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Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 888 (2009).
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decisions, blur the lines of public accountability, or increase the risk of
arbitrary decisions.”112 Below are several examples where Congress
crosses that line.
Interpretive methodologies play a critical role in the decisionmaking process, and Congress likely cannot dictate a Justice’s
methodologies. Professor Thomas Healy argues that Congress cannot
compel or prohibit the Court from adhering to a specific interpretive
methodology.113 He contends that implementing such a statute—for
example, one that prohibits the use of originalism—would both “affect
the likelihood of reaching certain conclusions . . . [and] undermine
[the Court’s] ability to ensure the legitimacy of their conclusions.”114
In extending that commentary to a hypothetical statute prohibiting the
use of stare decisis, Healy argues “[i]t would interfere with the power
of the courts to ensure the effectiveness of their decisions by choosing
whatever methodology they think will maximize the legitimacy of their
legal determinations.”115
Any intrusion by Congress that restricts a Justice’s timetable for
authoring opinions may also pose an unconstitutional intrusion on
decision-making. This does not include timetables for litigants, such
as deadlines to respond to complaints, but concerns only purely
judicial functions, like authoring opinions.116 Professor William Ryan
argues that imposing time limits on when judges must issue opinions
would reduce the amount of time they would have to devote to other
cases, thus increasing the risk of arbitrary decision-making.117 This
increased risk of arbitrary decision-making could have an outcome
determinative effect, especially considering how overworked and timepressured the judicial system already is.
Professor William Ryan asks a similar question for a hypothetical
statute requiring the Supreme Court to issue only unanimous
opinions.118 This would be a clear unconstitutional intrusion into
judicial decision-making because it would suppress each Justice’s
independent views as to whether the majority opinion is correct.119
112

See Ryan, supra note 107, at 798.
See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2008).
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Id. at 1202.
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Id. at 1206.
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See Ryan, supra note 107, at 799–800.
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Most importantly, this would have a detrimental effect on the Court’s
main objective—to decide cases correctly.120 This hypothetical statute
would force compromise and unanimity at the expense of an accurate
holding and would have a clear outcome-determinative result on cases
before the Court. Furthermore, such a statute would force the Court
to expend a tremendous effort trying to draft a unanimous holding,
thus frustrating efficiency—another core goal of the justice system.
Finally, scholars argue that courts have “inherent authority to
regulate their internal affairs,” such as “the times for court sessions and
Professor Robert Pushaw
the system for assigning cases.”121
acknowledges that Congress has allowed the Court almost “complete
discretion over . . . internal housekeeping details,” including docket
and case management.122 Like Ryan’s argument that mandating
unanimous opinions is an unconstitutional intrusion into judicial
decision making, managing cases and the docket impacts timing and
ultimately how the court goes about saying what the law is. However,
Pushaw argues that Article I permits Congress to “pass legislation that
it deems necessary and proper for federal courts to fulfill their duties
This includes statutes
in light of changing circumstances.”123
regulating the internal affairs of the Court, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2, which
sets the start date of every session as the first Monday of October.124
Congress can regulate the internal affairs of the Court, but it oversteps
its boundaries when it interferes with judicial decision-making in a
manner that lessens impartiality, damages public accountability, or
leads to arbitrary decisions.125
IV. APPLYING SEPARATION OF POWERS TO THE SHADOW DOCKET
This Part will evaluate the constitutionality of a statute mandating
that the Court issue opinions and disclose all Justices’ votes in cases on
the shadow docket. Each section will first identify whether the
proposal is necessary and proper, and then explain why the proposal
does not violate separation of powers principles.
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Id. at 812–13.
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 853 (2001).
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A. Mandating Opinion Writing
This section will assess the constitutionality of a hypothetical
statute passed by Congress that would mandate that the Court author
a written, reasoned opinion in the event it alters the status quo of a
lower court.
1. Why Mandating Opinion Writing is Necessary and
Proper
Congress has routinely regulated the Court using its power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.126 Congress may use reasonably
calculated means to achieve legitimate legislative ends.127 This
hypothetical statute is a legitimate means aimed at improving both the
transparency and legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Concerns about
the Court’s overall legitimacy have gotten so serious that the President
created a Commission investigating potential reforms.128 The shadow
docket itself has also come under fire from both chambers of Congress,
with each hosting hearings to discuss the docket in the wake of
controversial decisions.129
Congress has not been shy about imposing standards on the
Court.130 Congress has properly used its powers to enact legislation
regulating the number of Justices on the bench, their oath of office,
the start date for sessions, and even ethical guidelines.131 All of these
statutes are reasonably established to structure the Supreme Court in
a purposeful and not arbitrary manner. A statute, for example, that
mandates Justices wear a green necktie is likely arbitrary and
unconstitutional. That hypothetical falls outside of Congress’ ability
to pass reasonable laws “necessary and proper” to achieving its
constitutional ends. Even a statute mandating Justices wear black
robes is likely arbitrary and fails to meet the necessary and proper
standard. This Comment is not dealing with such trivial proposals.
The Supreme Court’s legitimacy is at stake, and the public is growing
skeptical of the institution.132 Public perception of the Court is at its
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See Frost, supra note 88, at 457.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411–12 (1819).
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See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
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lowest since the turn of the millennia, and Congress would be remiss
if it neglected these concerns.133
A more restrictive view of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
however, could be an obstacle to enacting an opinion writing
requirement.134 James Madison endorsed this narrow interpretation
when he argued that Congress lacked authority to establish a national
bank because no enumerated clause in the Constitution granted this
power.135 Applying that interpretation to the hypothetical statute here,
one could argue it is unconstitutional because there is no explicit
enumerated power granting Congress the ability to regulate internal
affairs of the Court. Despite this lack of an explicit enumerated power,
a broader reading would likely be used in this instance to follow
centuries of precedent.136 Congress has a long history of regulating the
Court, and it should be no different here. Congress is within its power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to compel the Court to author
If this hypothetical statute was found to be an
opinions.137
unconstitutional intrusion by Congress, the Court would be forced to
strike down almost all widely accepted policies where Congress
controls the Court—from regulating the number of Justices to
defining the oaths those Justices take.
2. Why Mandating Opinion Writing Will Not Influence
Judicial Decision-Making
When considering whether Congress is telling the Court how to
say what the law is, scholars are generally concerned with outcome
determinative encroachments that lessen impartiality, damage public
accountability, or increase arbitrary decision-making.138 For example,
Professor Thomas Healy argues that congressional prohibition or
compulsion of certain interpretive methodologies, such as stare decisis
or originalism, would unconstitutionally remove some outcomes the

133
See Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supremecourt.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (Showing the highest disapproval rating for the
Supreme Court in the twenty-first century at 53 percent).
134
See generally Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and
the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018) (defining a narrow reading
of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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Id. at 427–28.
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See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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See generally id. (that the broad approach in McCulloch should yield the result that
this statute would be constitutional).
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See Ryan, supra note 107, at 798.
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Court could arrive at.139 By mandating that the Court author opinions,
Congress would be forcing Justices to articulate their outcomes, rather
than taking any off the table.
Some scholars are skeptical as to the extent the authoring of
opinions factors into how judges arrive at their decisions.140 Judge
James Posner posited that “[t]here is almost no legal outcome that a
really skillful legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish.”141
In other words, judges can author an opinion as the means to justify
whatever ends they choose, no matter how “outlandish” those ends
may seem.142 Though a cynical view, these words from the thirty-six
year veteran of the Court of Appeals shed light on how authorship and
writing the opinion itself has little to no impact on the outcome of the
case. Rather, the written opinion serves to furnish transparency to the
public and lower courts, while conferring accountability upon the
Justice authoring the opinion.143
Another concern is whether adding extra opinions to a Justice’s
already busy workload would be an undue influence on decisionmaking. Some scholars argue that placing restrictive time limits on
opinions may increase the risk of arbitrary decision-making.144 If
Congress were to require the Supreme Court to issue opinions for all
cases on the shadow docket, this argument would be applicable, for
the Court handles thousands of cases a year.145 This Comment, and
most scholars, however, strive only to mandate opinion writing in cases
where the Court alters the status quo, which occurs far less frequently.
In fact, the Court only alters the status quo on average between fifteen
and twenty times per year on its shadow docket.146 The importance of
these cases is not diminished by the fact that they occur less frequently;
rather, it is exemplified because these instances of reversing the status
quo often come in the most controversial orders.
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Opponents could also argue that the fact that Justices need only
author opinions when the Court alters the status quo could
disincentivize reversing lower courts. The burdens of drafting an
opinion could motivate Justices to uphold lower courts so that they
need not draft an opinion, thus making their decision arbitrary. This
concern is unfounded. Even when shadow docket orders are issued
without opinions, they often include lengthy dissents and
concurrences, suggesting Justices are not prioritizing their free time at
the expense of expounding upon their opinions.147 Additionally, this
will not have an adverse effect on any litigant generally but depends
merely on what side of the procedural aisle a litigant is on. Could
progressive litigants struggle more to have a Fifth Circuit opinion
reversed, and likewise a more conservative litigant in the Ninth Circuit?
This is unlikely so long as Justices would not prioritize saving time from
drafting a mandatory opinion over voting for the litigant they feel
should be victorious. This concern is unconvincingly based solely on
the idea that the Justices would lazily and arbitrarily rule to save from
drafting an opinion.
Further, to argue that mandating opinion authorship would have
any objective effect on the outcome of a case is a dangerous suggestion.
Such a suggestion would imply that Justices would rule differently if
they actually needed to justify their ruling to the public. That would
also imply that Justices who issue orders without written opinions
might deliver decisions that cannot be justified. This reinforces the
notion that this statute is within Congress’s power, for it would reduce
the likelihood of arbitrary decision-making, rather than escalate it.
Finally, Congress would not be encroaching on the Court because
it is not seizing the Court’s power to author opinions for itself or
another branch.148 Richard Murphy explains that “separation of
powers does not protect the independence of the courts by preventing
Congress, the lawmaker, from using laws to regulate the courts, the
law-enforcers.
Rather, separation of powers protects judicial
independence by preventing Congress from usurping the judicial

147
See e.g., Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142 S. Ct. 1347 (2022) (referring to the fact that
the majority opinion here is one paragraph, while the dissenting opinions is over two
pages); Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 889 (2022) (referring to the fact that the
majority opinion here is one paragraph, but the concurrences and dissents were over
twenty-one pages long).
148
See Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1128 (2003).
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power for itself.”149 Congress would merely be compelling the Court,
in limited circumstances, to provide reasoning and do its own job.
Justice Marshall assigned the system of opinion writing to the judiciary
by insisting “a single Justice deliver[s] the opinion of the Court, [and]
the other Justices [are] free to write separately to express disagreement
with the majority or [] offer alternate theories . . . .”150 In Marbury,
Justice Marshall further established that it is exclusively within the
power of the judiciary to “say what the law is,” and that it must
“expound and interpret that rule.”151 Contemporary understanding of
judicial review vests in the Supreme Court the power to both say what
the law is and articulate its reasoning through written opinions.
Congress would be making no attempt to usurp that power for itself by
requiring the Court to issue written opinions.
B. Mandating Vote Disclosure
This section will assess the constitutionality of a hypothetical
statute passed by Congress mandating that each Justice of the Court
disclose his or her vote on an order. As with the argument above,
Congress is within its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
pass this proposed statute.
1. Why Mandating Vote Disclosure Will Not Influence
Judicial Decision-Making
First, compelling the Court to disclose each Justices’ vote would
not limit any potential outcomes, like limiting ideological
interpretations would.152 In fact, such a requirement would not affect
decision-making at all. Disclosure of each Justices’ vote occurs only
after the Court has deliberated and the merits of the case have been
decided. Publishing these votes would do nothing more than enhance
the transparency of the Court in the eyes of the public. Further, on all
of their merits cases (besides per curiam opinions),153 Justices publicly
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display their votes without issue anyway. This question is even clearer
than the question concerning opinion authorship because it would not
require the time and mental commitment that authoring opinions
does.154
Second, arguments to the contrary would raise significant
concerns about an individual Justice’s commitment to his or her
decisions. Looking back to the Willie Smith case, four Justices cast
their vote publicly to stay execution, three publicly dissented, and
Justices Alito and Gorsuch did not announce their vote to the public.155
Either one or both of Justices Alito and Gorsuch must have sided with
the majority, and to argue that either would have voted differently had
they publicly cast their vote would be an insult to their integrity as
independent jurists. To argue any Justice would cast votes they are not
prepared to stand by further emphasizes the importance of this
potential legislation to improve the transparency of the Court.
Therefore, as with opinion authorship discussed above, Congress likely
can compel the Court to disclose each Justices’ vote without interfering
with the doctrine of separation of powers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is in the headlines, and the usage of its
emergency docket, commonly known as the “shadow docket,” is at the
forefront of controversy. The issues with the docket are not simply
with the outcomes of the cases, but rather how they are released to the
public. The Court issues more than ten times the number of orders
on its shadow docket than its traditional merits docket, and many of
those orders are released without reasoning and without identifying
who voted for the resolution. For the more controversial orders, this
ambiguity leaves many to wonder if the Justices can be held
accountable for their decisions. The absence of transparency presents
difficulties not just for lower courts, but for public officials who are
finding it increasingly challenging to hold the Court responsible for its
actions.
Experts propose that Congress should respond and pass
legislation that compels the Court to both author opinions on all
orders that alter the status quo and publish all the Justices’ votes to the
154
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public. It is within Congress’s powers to pass legislation to reform the
Court so long as it does not have an influence on decision-making that
lessens impartiality, damages public accountability, or increases
arbitrary decision-making. These statutes do just the opposite: they
increase accountability by making the Court more transparent and
decrease the risk of arbitrary decision-making by holding Justices more
accountable to their votes.

